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FOCUSED DISCUSSION INVITED PAPER
Creation Myths and Epistemic
Boundaries∗
Daryn Lehoux†
Scholars looking back to the earliest stirrings of the philosophical
tradition in ancient Greece have often seen a rational approach
to nature cleaving itself off from an older approach, that of the
mythographer. If this account were right, we would have here
a major (and perhaps the first major) drawing of an epistemic
boundary. There are, however, mounting reasons to question this
narrative that have been accumulating across several modern
disciplines. This paper explores the most important challenges
to the myth-to-science narrative and suggests that the different
ways of framing the ancient debates have much to do with the
boundaries between modern disciplines and/or academic cultures.
Once upon a time, people believed that the world was full of gods.
Natural processes like thunder and lightning were explained by recourse to
divine actions. They were seen as the ineffable will of unobservable beings.
Earthquakes were caused by Poseidon, angry at some transgression.
Epilepsy was possession, disease was punishment. The sky at night was
painted full of heroes and monsters. Then one day, something changed:
a small group of people at one time and in one place began to insist that
the old explanations would no longer do. Instead they looked for a new
kind of explanation, one that involved only natural entities and processes
rather than supernatural ones. Epilepsy was now caused by a surplus
of cerebral phlegm overflowing into the veins that normally carry air up
into the brain. Earthquakes were caused by subterranean winds, rumbling
around in openings deep underground. No more gods acting out whims,
just natural forces acting according to natural processes. Experience,
tangible and testable, thus replaced speculation and superstition as ways
of understanding–of knowing–the world. Science, in short, was born.
Maybe. But there are some hints that something has gone wrong in
the telling. For one, the story finds itself standing fairly firmly on one
side of one kind of boundary, that of modern academic disciplinarity:
although something like this story is ubiquitous in the history of philosophy
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and in the history of the sciences, one would be hard pressed to find
anthropologists, historians of religion, or historians of mythology in the last
thirty years talking in anything like this way–who said the function of myth
was explanation in anything like this sense1 (Sedley 2007; Graham 2006;
Algra 1999; French 1994; Lindberg 1992)? One might also worry about the
categorical division between natural and supernatural, which are after all
our categories not theirs. Surely Homer’s gods are every bit as much a part
of nature as his humans are, and they act in many of the same ways. And
what about the new explanations, these phlegms and subterranean winds?
How are one set of made-up nonexistent entities better than another set of
made-up nonexistent entities? One might respond by saying that although
phlegm is not really the cause of epilepsy, it at least has the virtue of being
a real substance; Zeus is no such thing.2 Then again, though, black bile
seems also not to have been a real substance–its existence was instead
very likely inferred based on certain disease patterns (Nutton 2004, 84).
Likewise the great Hellenistic (physical) causal entity called pneuma was
often imperceptible, usually because it was not (as we should say) actually
there. One might also worry about what kind of reality the ‘air veins’
implicated in epilepsy are supposed to have.
We are further faced with the problem so forcefully pointed out by David
Sedley, that the Presocratics and their successors (Plato, Aristotle, the
Stoics) are, almost to a man, utterly saturated in theological teleology. To
use Sedley’s well-chosen word, the great majority of Greek philosophers
are creationists (Sedley 2007). Sedley’s point should further remind us that
myth and religion, whatever they had been doing before the Presocratics,
never went away after them. Myth and theology in fact continued to
intertwine themselves with philosophy (including natural philosophy) for
a very long time indeed (Buxton 1999; Morgan 2000; Taub 2008). One
need only take the quickest of glances at Plato’s Timaeus or the Derveni
papyrus to see that mythos and logos were far from mutually exclusive,
and indeed there was a longstanding ancient philosophical tradition that
held that myths encoded important philosophical truths (indeed, did it ever
go away?) (Brisson 1996; Boyes-Stones 2003; Ramelli and Lucchetta
2004; Struck 2004). It is also significant, to turn the point 180◦ around,
that one of the most compelling recent accounts of Roman religion argues
that at its heart was a dedicated and careful empiricism–which is explicitly
taken to mean close observation of the natural world (Ando 2006).
Geoffrey Lloyd, who has written several books on the origins question,
sees a larger issue hiding itself in the idea of different mentalities (Lloyd
1A good survey is Csapo 2005. Perhaps the best criticism of the explanation model is
Veyne 1983.
2This tack is taken by, e.g., Longrigg 1993.
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1990). Do we have a “mythopoeic” mentality being opposed or replaced
by a “naturalistic” mentality, or do we have different contexts and different
discourses coexisting and interacting–and doing so not just in the same
culture, but in the same individual author? At the same time, though, Lloyd
does not deny the claim that something new was happening in the early
philosophers and physicians, even while he recognizes how very messy
the question is–one Hippocratic author denouncing faith-healing quacks,
another recommending prayer to the sick, for example. Likewise, as
several scholars have pointed out, the chronology of the birth-of-naturalism
account is all messed up: rather than being superseded by “rational
medicine,” the cult of Asclepius has its birth and expansion at exactly the
same time and across exactly the same geographic regions as Hippocratic
medicine does (Lloyd 2003; Jouanna 1992; Edelstein and Edelstein 1945).
So also, Lloyd is quick to point out that both Hippocratics and religious
healers used many of the same methods, and that the Hippocratic
criticisms of faith-healers are hardly financially disinterested.
An important part of Lloyd’s approach has been his use of research and
methodology from outside of the history of philosophy proper. By crossing
disciplinary boundaries and reading a lot of recent anthropology, Lloyd has
been able to incorporate some important approaches to the essentially
foreign ideas of the ancient Greeks that enabled him to shed light on
how intertwined ancient Greek science and myth were, even among
Greeks who explicitly professed otherwise (more on them in a moment).
Indeed, we should expect a more nuanced approach to mythology among
anthropologists, whose subjects of study are standing right there in front
of the researchers, able to talk about, clarify, criticize, and respond to the
various classifications and mentalities that might be ascribed to them. On
hearing the claim that a jaguar is really a human spirit in cat’s clothing,3 the
anthropologist could, I suppose, run off and talk about the fundamentally
nonscientific mentality of his host culture, but that would be very poor
anthropology indeed. Instead, the task is to try and discern what that
sentence might mean within the particular cultural and linguistic context
in which it was uttered. Was it part of a ritual? An entertaining story? Was
it an allegory with some moral point? What exactly do the terms mean?
To directly compare it, contextless, to the kinds of things scientists say
about jaguars is to blur every relevant category under which either set of
statements gets its meaning.
Beyond the different interpretations of myth that we find across
disciplinary boundaries, there are also linguistic boundaries across
which the myth/science dichotomy does not travel easily. The standard
interpretation of the birth of naturalism (or science, or philosophy...) as I put
3I owe the example to Lloyd’s reading of Viveiros de Castro 1998.
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it forth above, is, it could be argued, a noticeably Anglo-American beast.
French historians of philosophy in particular, see a significantly different
picture. Just a list of book titles should suffice to show the trend: Paul
Veyne’s seminal Did the Greeks Believe in their Myths? (1983–answer
to the title’s question: not literally); Marcel Detienne’s The Creation of
Mythology (1981); Luc Brisson’s How Philosophers Saved Myths (1996)
and his earlier Plato: Words and Myths (1982).
To find philosophers in English asking hard questions about the
myth-to-science narrative is more difficult, though thankfully not impossible
(Lloyd 1979; 1987; 2003; Buxton 1999; Morgan 2000; Taub 2008). At the
same time, though, those hard questions do not generally amount to an
outright rejection of philosophy’s creation myth as such. Even the critics
seem to agree that there is some kernel of truth in the story. But we have
to be careful. Suppose we make the claim that the Hippocratic innovation
was to say that because all diseases have natural causes (to be treated
with natural remedies), so the invocation of a second (divine) level of
causation–even if it is truly there–is superfluous (Lloyd 2003). One danger
is that this interpretation assumes the primacy of the physical, naturalistic
starting point, which may in fact beg the question. After all, why should
divinity be the second level rather than the first? We could imagine a
faith-healer responding that since gods cause all things, gods must be
appealed to in the first instance for healing; invoking a second (naturalistic)
set of causes then becomes superfluous. Here the modern historian
may be swayed one way rather than the other, perhaps, by the implicit
supposition that faith-healing does (and did) not work and naturalistic
medicine does (or did), so our Hippocratic would win this debate on
empirical grounds–or would he? Given the ancient evidence, appeals to
efficacy or inefficacy cut both ways at best (and in any case the question
is unstudied and possibly un-study-able). But the efficacy angle does not
just disappear for all that. For one thing, the emphasis on naturalistic
causes in one group of ancient authors is widely seen as simultaneously
enabling the empirical testing–and thus the improvement–of hypotheses.
Knowledge becomes cumulative the instant it becomes testable. After all,
to say that lightning is not caused by Zeus but is in fact caused by Thor is
no real improvement in knowledge. By limiting relevant explanations of the
natural world, we open up the possibility of making real progress as various
hypotheses get put forward and tested. So also the tools of epistemology
change: logic versus association, demonstration versus assertion.
We are back, in short, to our starting point (with all its attendant
criticisms). Clearly, if we are to avoid this eternal recurrence of the same,
naı̈ve, myth/science distinction, then some careful fine-tuning is needed if
we are to acknowledge that there is something different in the philosophers
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and Hippocratics than in the mythogrophers and faith-healers. I want to
suggest that the way out may lie in avoiding the temporal trap. Why do
we need to see a birth of philosophy or of science as a way of thinking
rather than as a genre of writing? After all, how safe is it really to assume
that Hesiod or his forebears had no notion of naturalistic causation, no
sense that experience improved knowledge, no understanding of how to
be convinced by a rational argument? Surely the prospect is ridiculous.
Hesiod may well tell a story in which the creation of the Cosmos is at
the hands of the gods in one way or another, but why assume that he,
his father, and his father’s father credited all causation to gods? Before
philosophy got written down, people had intervened in the world to produce
all kinds of nonobvious (and often sophisticated) inventions, everything
from agriculture, to bronze and iron, to oceangoing ships, to complex
irrigation systems, and on, and on. How can one talk about, say, the
domestication and selective breeding of horses, cattle, pigs, dogs, sheep,
cats, and goats without assuming that the breeders had some–any–theory
of inheritance, some naturalistic understanding of reproduction? One did
not get puppies, let alone better puppies, by praying. One also did not
improve the hulls or sails of vessels, navigation techniques, or weather
prediction techniques by waiting for better ships to fall from the sky. To
think that before Thales people had no naturalistic idea of causes is to
put neolithic and bronze-age people in the position of the priest in the old
joke, who prayed week after week to win the lottery so he could repair his
crumbling church. After failing time and again, he finally curses God for not
helping his people. God’s response: “Meet me halfway: Buy a ticket!”
In the end, then, boundaries abound. But none of them, it seems, can
be seen as epistemic. Disciplinary boundaries, temporal boundaries (real
or assumed), linguistic boundaries, generic boundaries (poetry versus
prose), media boundaries (oral versus written), all of these get a moment
in the spotlight when we look closely at the creation myth of science or
philosophy, but the epistemic moral should perhaps be held in that same
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